How Does Moderate Supervision Curb Elite Capture? Lessons from China’s Sustainable Water Governance
Li Li,Linli Li,Qian Li and Ashfaq Ahmad Shah
Sustainability 2025, 17, 9577
Abstract:Elite capture,a power structure problem involving rent-seeking,hinders sustainable water resources management.Governments play crucial roles in instilling public legitimacy in water governance,a common-pool resource that benefits from cooperative solutions such as pilot competitions,co-monitoring,and inter-agency coordination.A study of South-to-North Water Diversion Projects in China showed how,when governments outsource small projects to local sub-contractors,a method named moderate supervision (ruo jiandu) can enable effective oversight,which is superior to a bidding model with strict supervision (qiang jiandu).The concept of moderate supervision was initiated in 2023,before which most small projects had been left in a risky state with no supervision (ling jiandu).Analysis of a case in Shandong Yellow River Water Diversion Irrigation Area involved semi-structured in-depth interviews.Findings revealed that an elite-government-villagers tripartite spiral was composed of 3 dimensions reshaping a positive elite culture:first,a whitelist of qualified local contractors;second,co-monitoring of multiple stakeholders with influence exerted by a three-tier mobilization system;third,inter-agency coordination innovatively enabling smooth functioning between policy entrepreneurs of formal institutions and local social governance of informal ones.Policy implications to underscore real-world applicability are provided.
Keywords:moderate supervision;common pool resources (CPRs);elite capture;sustainable water management;development effectiveness
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How Does Moderate Supervision Curb Elite Capture Lessons from China’s Sustainable Water Governance.Li Li,Linli Li,Qian Li and Ashfaq Ahmad Shah.pdf
How Does Moderate Supervision Curb Elite Capture? Lessons from China’s Sustainable Water Governance
Li Li,Linli Li,Qian Li and Ashfaq Ahmad Shah
Sustainability 2025, 17, 9577
Abstract:Elite capture,a power structure problem involving rent-seeking,hinders sustainable water resources management.Governments play crucial roles in instilling public legitimacy in water governance,a common-pool resource that benefits from cooperative solutions such as pilot competitions,co-monitoring,and inter-agency coordination.A study of South-to-North Water Diversion Projects in China showed how,when governments outsource small projects to local sub-contractors,a method named moderate supervision (ruo jiandu) can enable effective oversight,which is superior to a bidding model with strict supervision (qiang jiandu).The concept of moderate supervision was initiated in 2023,before which most small projects had been left in a risky state with no supervision (ling jiandu).Analysis of a case in Shandong Yellow River Water Diversion Irrigation Area involved semi-structured in-depth interviews.Findings revealed that an elite-government-villagers tripartite spiral was composed of 3 dimensions reshaping a positive elite culture:first,a whitelist of qualified local contractors;second,co-monitoring of multiple stakeholders with influence exerted by a three-tier mobilization system;third,inter-agency coordination innovatively enabling smooth functioning between policy entrepreneurs of formal institutions and local social governance of informal ones.Policy implications to underscore real-world applicability are provided.
Keywords:moderate supervision;common pool resources (CPRs);elite capture;sustainable water management;development effectiveness
Full text download:How Does Moderate Supervision Curb Elite Capture Lessons from China’s Sustainable Water Governance.Li Li,Linli Li,Qian Li and Ashfaq Ahmad Shah.pdf
